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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
New Union Roofing and Drywall (NURD) is a three em-
ployee business which specializes in roofing. All of its busi-
ness was performed within New Union, in the 1 mile square
neighborhood of Moll's Gardens of Cathertown. In the course
of its roofing business activities NURD prepared batches of
"roof acid" a chemical which is applied to an existing roof to
ease the removal process. As mixed with water roof acid is a
listed hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), which the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) implements in New Union. Roof
acid was listed as a RCRA hazardous waste on December 31,
1980. On 20 to 30 occasions from 1981 to 1983, NURD pre-
pared more roof acid than it needed for a particular job.
NURD disposed of its excess "roof acid" by mixing it with
fruit juice and adding it to its compost pit. While discarded
roof acid was listed hazardous waste under RCRA, neither
the roof acid alone nor the mixture which resulted when
mixed with soft drinks qualified as characteristic hazardous
waste under RCRA.
The Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of New
Union (BRANU) is a three employee for profit business incor-
porated in New Union in 1984. Since 1984, BRANU has
purchased 3 sites: a former dry cleaner, which it remediated
and resold as a photo supply shop; a former gas station,
which is still owned by BRANU and which BRANU hopes to
resell; and the former NURD site. All of the sites are in the
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/34
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Moll's Gardens neighborhood. At the time of BRANU's
purchase of the Moll's Gardens site from NURD in 1990,
BRANU did not know and had no reason to know that any
hazardous substance was disposed of in, or at, the site; that
the transfer deed and other documents between NURD and
BRANU are silent as to liability in this instance; and that no
applicable New Union state law is relevant.
NURD and BRANU have minimal contacts with inter-
state commerce. The parties agree that neither BRANU nor
NURD directly partake of any interstate commerce, except
that the roof acid used by NURD was manufactured in Vir-
ginia and transported through interstate commerce to a hard-
ware store in Cathertown, where NURD purchased it.
Likewise, NURD's truck was manufactured in Michigan, and
transported through interstate commerce to a dealership in
Cathertown, where NURD bought it. All other supplies were
manufactured and purchased in New Union. The parties
agree that for all supplies used by NURD, including those
made in New Union and the roof acid and truck from other
states, the markets are national with prices set competitively
from many manufacturers. Moreover, the parties agree that
both BRANU and NURD have indirect effects on interstate
commerce to the same extent as any economic activity of their
size through, for example, payments to employees which then
enable employees to purchase goods and services from out of
state, and purchases from suppliers that, though the
purchases were manufactured in New Union, provide profits
to both the suppliers and the manufacturers which enable
them to pay their own employees, who in turn purchase goods
and services in interstate commerce.
In 1990 following BRANU's purchase of the former
NURD site, the EPA was notified that roof acid had been dis-
posed of at the site. EPA spent $100,000 for such sampling
and follow-up laboratory analysis of the samples taken, and
concluded that the soil was contaminated with roof acid "to
constitute a danger should the site be used as residential
property or other land use in which soil contact by individu-
als is likely."
10191996]
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BRANU remediated the site spending $200,000, all in
1993. (The site is now remediated and a family lives in the
residence BRANU constructed on the site.) Later in 1993
BRANU commenced this action under RCRA (properly fulfil-
ling the notice requirements of RCRA 7002(b)(2)(A) and other
applicable notice requirements) and the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) (also properly fulfilling CERCLA's notice require-
ments). BRANU sought compensation for its response costs,
and at approximately the same time (and within the statute
of limitations) EPA commenced this action under CERCLA,
seeking recovery of its $100,000 in sampling and analysis
costs. The parties agree that the only CERCLA 107 issue is
whether what NURD disposed of is a hazardous substance by
cross referencing to other provisions; the only provision
through which roof acid might be a hazardous substance is
through listing as a hazardous waste under RCRA. With the
consent of the parties, the two cases have been consolidated,
and EPA participates in the RCRA issues as an amicus.
THE DECISION BELOW
I. NURD Liability to BRANU Under RCRA 7002
BRANU asserts that NURD is liable to BRANU under
RCRA for restitution of BRANU's $200,000 site remediation
costs under RCRA 7002. NURD asserts that RCRA 7002
does not provide that relief includes restitution, and also that
RCRA 7002 cannot constitutionally be applied to grant any
relief on these facts. EPA, as amicus, agrees with NURD that
RCRA 7002 does not provide for restitution on these facts,
but for different reasons.
RCRA 7002(a)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part that "any
person may commence a civil action on his own behalf...
against any person.., including any past or present genera-
tor,.. . or past or present owner or operator of a... disposal
facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the
past or present... disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment." The parties agree that
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/34
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NURD fits the specified criteria and that, until BRANU
remediated the site in 1993, the site presented an imminent
and substantial endangerment.
What the parties do not agree on is what relief is called
for. BRANU, pointing to RCRA 7002's authorization for the
district court to "order such person to take such other action
as may be necessary," says that this provides to the court its
full equitable powers, and asks for restitution, citing to KFC
Western, Inc. v. Meghrig (49 F.3d 518, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 20638
(9th Cir. 1995) as precedent. See generally J. Martin Robert-
son, Restitution Under RCRA sec. 7002(a)(1)(B): The Courts
Finally Grant What Congress Authorized, 25 Envtl. L. Rep.
10491 (Sept. 1995).
NURD counters that BRANU and KFC Western read
more into RCRA 7002 than is there, and that under applica-
ble Supreme Court precedent finding implied private causes
of action is disfavored. See generally John E. Sullivan, Im-
plied Private Causes of Action and the Recoverability of Dam-
ages Under the RCRA Citizen Suit Provision, 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10408 (Aug. 1995). Moreover, NURD says, the facts in
this case are so local in nature that interstate commerce is
not implicated and so to apply RCRA 7002 to these facts is to
exceed Congress' authority to regulate under the Commerce
Clause, citing to United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
EPA, like BRANU, asserts that the Lopez criteria are
met, but concludes that RCRA 7002 nonetheless does not au-
thorize a private cause of action. EPA acknowledges that
RCRA 7002 is quite similar to RCRA 7003, which provides
relief when sought by the federal government. Nonetheless,
EPA maintains, though the words are similar, they are not
identical, and moreover under applicable Supreme Court case
law though a high burden must be met to find a private cause
of action from the text of a statute, the burden is lower in
finding a government cause of action. Consequently, EPA
says, RCRA 7003 authorizes restitution when sought by EPA,
but RCRA 7002 does not authorize restitution when sought
by a private party.
10211996]
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This court is unwilling to engage in judicial activism, and
concludes that Congress was within its Commerce Clause au-
thority in enacting RCRA 7002, particularly in light of the
congressional finding in RCRA 1002(a)(4) that "problems of
waste disposal" "have become a matter national in scope."
However, in enacting RCRA 7002, this court does not believe
that an private cause of action for restitution was created,
and so this court holds that NURD is not liable to BRANU
under RCRA 7002.
11. NURD Liability to BRANU and EPA under
CERCLA 107
In the alternative to restitution under RCRA 7002,
BRANU asks for cost recovery from NURD under CERCLA
107. EPA asks likewise.
The parties agree that the only CERCLA 107 issue is
whether what NURD disposed of is a "hazardous substance"
for CERCLA liability purposes. CERCLA 101(14) defines
"hazardous substance" by cross-referencing to other provi-
sions; the only provision through which roof acid might be a
hazardous substance is through its listing as a hazardous
waste under RCRA.
BRANU's and EPA's initial reasoning is straightforward:
roof acid is a listed RCRA hazardous waste, which makes it a
hazardous substance under section 101(14), which makes
NURD liable for its disposal under section 107.
But NURD points out that NURD did not dispose of roof
acid, but actually disposed of a mixture of roof acid and fruit
juice left over from lunch, which was prepared in good faith to
add nutrients to a compost pit. This mixture of roof acid and
fruit juice was not a listed waste, and is only hazardous
through EPA's "mixture rule," which states that a "solid
waste ... is a hazardous waste if... [iut is a mixture of solid
waste and one or more hazardous wastes listed" (40 CFR
261.3).
NURD concedes that if the mixture rule applies, then its
disposal was of a hazardous waste. However, NURD points
out that the D.C. Circuit vacated the mixture rule in Shell
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/34
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Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 950 F.2d 741, 22
Envtl. L. Rep. 20305 (D.C. Cir. 1991, as amended 1992).
Although EPA reissued the rule in 1992 (57 Fed. Reg. 7628),
and stated that the rule was in effect from its initial issuance
in 1980 until the D.C. Circuit vacated it in 1991 (57 Fed. Reg.
at 7630), it is not clear that the rule was indeed in effect dur-
ing the time of NURD's actions in 1981 through 1983. The
language of the D.C. Circuit opinion does indicate that the
court envisioned a "discontinuity" in the regulation of hazard-
ous waste. Likewise, the 8th Circuit has interpreted the D.C.
Circuit's opinion as declaring the mixture rule void ab initio
(United States v. Goodner Brothers Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d
380, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 21201 (1992)).
On whether the mixture rule applied during the 1980-
1991 period, all three parties cite to James E. Satterfield,
EPA's Mixture Rule: Why the Fuss?, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 10712
(Dec. 1994); Van Carson, Philip Schillawski, and Mark Shere,
Rebuttal: The Mixture Rule and the Environmental Code, 25
Envtl. L. Rep. 10244 (May 1995); and James E. Satterfield,
EPA's Continuing Jurisdiction Regulation: A Response to
"The Mixture Rule and the Environmental Code", 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10262 (May 1995).
NURD asserts that the roof acid - fruit juice mixture was
not a hazardous waste, and hence not a CERCLA hazardous
substance, in 1981 through 1983, and so NURD is not liable
under CERCLA 107(a)(2). In addition, NURD raises a de-
fense specific to its liability to EPA: NUJRD points out that if
the mixture rule was invalid, its waste was not hazardous in
1990 when EPA conducted its response action. Thus, NURD
says, although it acknowledges that the mixture rule has
since been properly reissued, applying it retroactively en-
ables EPA to recover from NURD for costs which NURD was
not liable for at both the time of disposal and at the time of
EPA's expenditures.
Both EPA and BRANU assert that the mixture rule was
valid from its initial issuance in 1980, without interruption.
But they assert differently in the alternative. If the mixture
rule was not valid at the time of NURD's disposal, BRANU
asserts, it is sufficient that it was valid at the time of
1996] 1023
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BRANU's response action in 1993. EPA asserts that it was
not necessary for the mixture rule to be valid when EPA con-
ducted its work in 1990, that it is sufficient for the rule to be
applicable when EPA filed its action in 1993.
The court believes that NURD is most persuasive here.
The D.C. Circuit was clear that it was vacating the mixture
rule, not merely making it invalid from the date of decision
forward. If the EPA didn't accept the D.C. Circuit's decision,
its responsibility was to take the matter to the Supreme
Court. It is estopped and precluded now, in this court, to as-
sert otherwise. Thus, this mixture was not a hazardous
waste at the time of its disposal, nor, for EPA, at the time of
its cleanup. The court holds NURD is not liable under CER-
CLA 107.
Orders consistent with this decision are issued herewith.
/s/
R. N. Remus
United States District Judge
BRANU and the EPA have appealed the decision of the
United States District Court for the District of New Union.
DISCUSSION
I. IS § 7002, THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION OF
RCRA CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED
TO NURD?
(BRANU and EPA answer in the affirmative, NURD answers
in the negative)
The first issue to be decided is the constitutionality of
§ 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), as applied to the facts in this case. Although most of
the economic impact from NURD's actions is purely local in
nature, the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), declaring that a portion of the Gun
Free School Zones Act of 1990 violated the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution does not dictate that the
application of federal regulatory statutes to individual cases
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where there is very little if any affect on interstate commerce
must always be unconstitutional.
A. Facts and Reasoning in United States v. Lopez
In United States v. Lopez, the defendant, Alphonso Lo-
pez, was convicted of possession of a firearm in a school zone
in violation of the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GF-
SZA). United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
The portion of the GFSZA at issue in the case was section
922(q) which made knowing possession of a firearm in a
school zone a federal offense. Id. Lopez challenged the law
claiming that in enacting section 922(q) Congress exceeded
its powers under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. The Commerce Clause states that Con-
gress may "regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States...." U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed Lopez' convic-
tion finding that section 922(q) was constitutionally invalid.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals holding that section 922(q) was a purely criminal
statute which had no relation to commerce or economic activi-
ties and was not a proper exercise of Congress' Commerce
Clause powers. Id. at 1630. In reaching its decision, the
Court engaged in a thorough discussion of Commerce Clause
cases from the earliest decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. 1 (1824) to the present. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626-
30. The Court noted that up until 1937, only those activities
which were directly related to interstate commerce could be
regulated by Congress. Id. at 1628. The decision in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) was the turn-
ing point in Commerce Clause analysis according to the
Court in Lopez. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628. The Lopez Court
called specific attention to the holding in Jones & Laughlin
Steel that intrastate activities which "'have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control
is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from bur-
dens and obstructions' are within Congress' power to regu-
10251996]
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late." Id. (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
The Court in Lopez went on to discuss several other cases
dealing with the interaction of intrastate and interstate ac-
tivities and their regulation under the Commerce Clause.
See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628. Although the Court noted that
Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause were ex-
tremely broad, they are not limitless. Id. at 1628-29. Gener-
ally, legislation enacted under Congress' Commerce Clause
powers must be supported by a rational basis in order for it to
be constitutional. Id. at 1629. The Court concluded that if
Congress did not choose to directly control either the chan-
nels of interstate commerce or people or things in interstate
commerce but instead sought to legislate concerning an activ-
ity related to interstate commerce, the activity to be regu-
lated must substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at
1629-30. This test is the essence of the Court's decision in
Lopez.
The Court concluded that a prohibition on the possession
of a firearm in a school zone was neither a control on the
channels of interstate commerce nor a regulation of an in-
strumentality in interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1630. Therefore, the activity would have to fit into the third
category and substantially affect interstate commerce in or-
der for section 922(q) to be constitutional. Id. In analyzing
section 922(q), the Court noted that there are a great many
activities which substantially relate to interstate commerce.
Perhaps the outermost limit on Congress' power to regulate
activities which substantially relate to interstate commerce,
according to the Lopez Court, was recognized when the
Supreme Court, in the case Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), permitted Congress to control the amount of wheat
grown by farmers even though some of that wheat was never
marketed but was used by the farmer to feed his family and
his livestock. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. Even under this
broad reach of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, the Lopez
Court determined that the constitutionality of section 922(q)
could not be demonstrated.
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In explaining its conclusion, the Court first stated that
section 922(q) was "a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enter-
prise, however broadly one might define those terms." Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. In a footnote, the Court noted that
criminal laws are generally the responsibility of the states
rather than the federal government. Id. at 1631 n.3. In addi-
tion, the Court also determined that, aside from firearm pos-
session in general having nothing to do with commerce, there
was no "jurisdictional element which would ensure, through
case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce." Id. at 1631. Finally, the Court
turned to the legislative history in search of specific findings
of an effect on interstate commerce but came up empty. Id.
The Court conceded that formal findings were not required
but concluded that such findings might have helped save sec-
tion 922(q). Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
Finally, the Court considered the government's argu-
ment that possession of a firearm substantially affects inter-
state commerce in at least three ways. The government first
claimed that violent crime is costly and that the costs extend
throughout the population. Id. at 1632. Second, the govern-
ment asserted that violence deters people from traveling in
areas thought to be unsafe. Id. Third, the United States pro-
posed that possession of guns in schools affects the learning
process to such a degree that decreased productivity and a
negative effect on the economy would result. Id. The Court
rejected these arguments, however, saying that to accept
them would make it very difficult if not impossible to find any
regulation that Congress could not connect to interstate com-
merce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. The Court refused to accept
dissenting Justice Breyer's argument that schools and educa-
tion could rationally be considered commercial. Id. at 1632-
33. In its conclusion, the Court acknowledged that while
great deference is given to Congress when it exercises its
commerce power, further expansion of this power beyond ex-
isting precedent was not proper. Id. at 1634.
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B. Hazardous Waste, RCRA and Interstate Commerce
As discussed above, the Lopez Court identified three
types of activities which can be regulated by Congress under
the Commerce Clause. The first category listed is "the use of
the channels of interstate commerce." United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995). The second area is "the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, or the persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities." Id. The third type of regula-
tion permitted is control over "those activities having a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. at 1629-30.
With regard to this last category, the Lopez Court concluded
that regulation will be constitutional if the "regulated activity
'substantially affects' interstate commerce." Id. at 1630.
The Lopez Court remarked that many different activities
fall within this third area. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
Specifically mentioned were restaurants which obtain sup-
plies from out-of-state (Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964)), hotels which have out-of-state guests (Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)), and
farmers' use of their own home-grown wheat (Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)). Activities that are wholly intra-
state can be regulated if they are "an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regula-
tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The Supreme
Court has held that once it has been determined that Con-
gress has the power to regulate under the Commerce Clause,
"it may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attain-
ment of the permitted end, even though they involve control
of intrastate activities. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
121 (1942). The Supreme Court has also recently held that
solid waste is an item of commerce which can properly be reg-
ulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. See Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural
Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992); Chemical Waste Mgmt.,
Inc. v. United States, 504 U.S. 334, 340 n.3 (1992).
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RCRA provisions can fall into any of the three listed cate-
gories. For example listing and documentation requirements
for proper transportation of hazardous waste, See e.g. 42
U.S.C. § 6923 (1988), may be said to fall under the first cate-
gory as a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Regulation of the storage of hazardous waste, See
e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 6924, would probably come under the second
category as a regulation of a thing in interstate commerce.
Finally, RCRA provisions protecting employees who provide
information regarding RCRA violations, 42 U.S.C. § 6971
(1988), would come under the third category since they con-
cern activities which substantially relate to interstate com-
merce. The portion of RCRA specifically at issue in the
instant case, § 7002 - the citizen suit provision, is not a direct
regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce.
It is unclear whether a court would consider citizen suits to
be a regulation of instrumentalities of interstate commerce
since such suits are brought by private citizens instead of the
government. An plausible argument can probably be made
for placing § 7002 in the third Lopez category since § 7002
covers mainly the procedural requirements for bringing a citi-
zen suit and does not directly regulate hazardous waste. The
decision in Lopez indicates that activities falling under the
third category will be more considered more critically. There-
fore, it will be assumed that citizen suit enforcement must
substantially affect interstate commerce in order to be
constitutional.
Almost immediately, an important distinction can be
drawn between the facts in Lopez and the instant case. The
statute at issue in Lopez is a criminal statute. A RCRA citi-
zen suit, on the other hand, is a civil action for equitable re-
lief brought in the absence of administrative enforcement by
the regulatory agency See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (1988). The
creation and enforcement of criminal laws has traditionally
been a state function. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3. How-
ever, federal regulation and regulatory agencies have been in
existence since the government created the Interstate Com-
merce Commission in 1887. See John H. Reese, Administra-
tive Law Principles and Practices 7 (1995). Therefore, it
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cannot be said that regulation of manufacturing, production,
transportation or marketing of goods is a traditional state
function. Since the Supreme Court has determined that solid
waste can be regulated under the Commerce Clause, it would
be difficult to argue that Congress may not regulate hazard-
ous waste as well. While the disposal of hazardous waste
may be thought of as a private use of one's land, traditionally
a state concern, disposal requirements are simply part of the
overall regulation of hazardous waste. Further, when im-
proper disposal contaminates commercial property or goods,
interstate commerce is arguably affected.
Once it is established that Congress may regulate a par-
ticular activity, it follows that it would be extremely ineffec-
tive for Congress to properly grant an agency the authority to
promulgate regulations without also being permitted to grant
that same agency the power to enforce the regulations it has
imposed. To pass the rational basis test, the means chosen to
enforce the regulations need only be reasonably adapted to
achieve the congressional aim. Thus, an argument can be
made that Congress can authorize citizen suits to enforce the
requirements of RCRA. Furthermore, given the budgetary
constraints placed upon agencies and the possibility of nonac-
tion for political reasons, citizen suits provide a means for en-
suring that regulatory statutes work to control interstate
commerce in the manner in which they were designed. If vio-
lations by certain regulated entities were regularly over-
looked, the effect on interstate commerce could be significant
in the form of low prices for goods produced by the entities
that escape enforcement action.
C. Local Effects of NURD's Activities
The major thrust of NURD's argument is that its activi-
ties regarding the roof acid are so local in nature as to render
the regulation of its activities unconstitutional. However, the
facts illustrate that the roof acid as well as other items re-
lated to NURD's business did indeed travel through inter-
state commerce. Furthermore, even if the facts of a
particular case demonstrate purely local effects, the regula-
tory scheme as a whole will not be found unconstitutional if
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aggregation of the local activities can have a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce. Since all the items used in
NURD's business are marketed nationally, it cannot be said
that the sum of all purely local transactions will not substan-
tially affect interstate commerce under United States v. Lo-
pez, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in
cases such as Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241.
Prior to 1937, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that
certain aspects of business, such as manufacturing, only indi-
rectly affected interstate commerce and, thus, could not be
properly regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause.
See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627 (1995).
Starting with its decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Supreme Court abandoned its
reliance on the distinction between direct and indirect effects
on interstate commerce as a basis for ruling on the validity of
legislation under the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1628. Instead, the test adopted by the Court in Jones &
Laughlin Steel was whether the activities sought to be regu-
lated "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to pro-
tect that commerce from burdens and obstructions." 301 U.S.
at 37. Later cases applied this rule to activities which would
historically have been considered to only indirectly affect in-
terstate commerce. See e.g. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
In Darby, the Court was presented with a challenge to
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) which prohibited the
shipment of certain goods manufactured under working con-
ditions which did not meet the standards set out in the FLSA.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 108 (1941). Despite its
concession that the manufacture of goods is not itself an act
of interstate commerce, 312 U.S. at 113, the Court neverthe-
less determined that regulation of wages and hours had
enough of an effect on interstate commerce to warrant regula-
tion by Congress, 312 U.S. at 123. With regard to the distinc-
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tion between interstate and intrastate effects, the Court
stated that "the power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce extends to the regulation through legislative action of
activities intrastate which have a substantial effect on the
commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power over it."
312 U.S. at 119-20. The Court also noted that "competition
by a small part may affect the whole and that the total effect
of the competition of many small producers may be great."
Id. at 123.
The process of examining the aggregate effects of a
number of purely local activities was again used in Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In Wickard, a farmer chal-
lenged the application of a regulation of wheat he had grown
on his farm and used for his own personal purposes in feeding
his family and his livestock. 317 U.S. 113-14. In upholding
the constitutionality of the regulation, the Court declined to
distinguish between producing, consuming and marketing
the wheat. Id. at 124. Instead, the Court determined that an
activity may be regulated, even if entirely local, if it had a
"substantial economic effect on interstate commerce [ I irre-
spective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier
time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."' Id. at 125.
The Court went on to say that although the farmer's "own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself
[that] is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contributions taken together
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from triv-
ial." Id. at 127-28. The Court refused to further consider the
regulation's "wisdom, workability, or fairness." 317 U.S. at
129.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964), the Supreme Court once again had the chance to
comment on purely local activities regulated by Congress.
Heart of Atlanta Motel involved a motel which maintained a
policy of not renting rooms to Negroes. 379 U.S. at 243. This
policy was in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at
249. In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Court
noted that, although there were no published formal findings
of fact regarding the effect of discrimination on interstate
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commerce, 379 U.S. at 252, Congress could exercise its com-
merce power if it had a rational basis for doing so and the
means chosen were reasonable. Id. at 258. The Court de-
clared that purely local effects would not defeat the legisla-
tion if interstate commerce is affected. Id.
The Court in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995), analyzed the section 922(q) of the Gun Free School
Zones Act of 1990 in light of its prior cases dealing with the
Commerce Clause. The Court initially found that section
922(q) was unconstitutional since it was a criminal provision
which was not related to interstate commerce. Id. at 1630-31.
After finding no obvious connection to interstate commerce,
the Court determined that there was no jurisdictional ele-
ment in the statute which might help a court conclude that a
particular instance of gun possession in a school zone affected
interstate commerce. Id. at 1631. Finally, the Court, noting
that congressional findings are not usually required to find
statutes consistent with the Commerce Clause, turned in
vain to the legislative history of section 922(q) in search of
formal findings which would demonstrate a connection be-
tween gun possession in a school zone and interstate com-
merce. Id. at 1631-32. Finally, the Court concluded that
"possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect interstate commerce." 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
Applying the Court's reasoning in the above cases to
NURD's actions seems to require a finding that, in spite of
the purely local effects, there is enough of a nexus to inter-
state commerce, both by NURD's individual actions and an
aggregation of the those actions with other disposers of haz-
ardous waste, to render NURD's constitutional argument un-
persuasive. Despite the lack of a jurisdictional element or
formal findings contained in RCRA itself, the generation,
transportation and disposal of hazardous waste and the pol-
lution it may beget clearly affect interstate commerce.
The parties have stipulated that the roof acid was manu-
factured in another state and moved through interstate com-
merce to reach New Union. The parties also agree that the
roof acid has a national market with competitive pricing.
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These two facts alone already provide more of a nexus to in-
terstate commerce than the home-grown wheat in Wickard v.
Filburn. Since the Lopez Court recognized Wickard as the
outer boundary of constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause, the 12th Circuit should not be strained to find
NURD's activities within congressional reach.
Even if NURD's activities were purely local and the roof
acid was not obtained through interstate commerce, the re-
quirements of Wickard would still be met due to the national
market and competitive pricing of roof acid. The aggregate
result of many purchases of roof acid locally could substan-
tially affect the national market price if roof acid sold only
locally was not subject to extensive regulation that would
tend to drive up the price. Furthermore, contamination due
to improper storage, transportation or disposal could easily
find its way into articles of interstate commerce or affect
those who travel in interstate commerce. Several of the sites
BRANU had purchased and remediated were resold as busi-
nesses which would potentially cater to interstate commerce.
The fact that the particular site at issue was used for residen-
tial and not commercial purposes should not invalidate appli-
cation of RCRA in this case. Such action would result in
numerous lawsuits requiring courts to make findings of fact
regarding many individual transactions to see if each one af-
fected interstate commerce. This type of extreme is not re-
quired under either Wickard or Lopez.
QUESTIONS FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
1. What section(s) of RCRA does NURD want the Court to
find unconstitutional?
Unconstitutional on its face or unconstitutional as ap-
plied to NURD?
2. What specifically does NURD find unconstitutional in
§ 7002?
3. NURD and BRANU both maintain that they have no di-
rect effects on interstate commerce, rather they both main-
tain that they have indirect effects on interstate commerce.
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Hasn't the Supreme Court long ago abandoned this
distinction?
4. What standard of review should the court apply?
5. What test did the Supreme Court define in Lopez to deter-
mine if legislation is within Congress' commerce powers? Is
this the right test? What do they think the test should be?
6. What aspects of the Gun Free School Zone did the
Supreme Court find objectionable? How are the facts here
the same or different?
7. BRANU wants the Court to find that the citizen suit provi-
sion of § 7002 is constitutional. How can a commercial real
estate transaction be an act of interstate commerce that Con-
gress can regulate? Given the Lopez decision what type of
commerce activity is this?
8. Doesn't Lopez seem to require something more than "a
connection" to interstate commerce? What if any legislative
findings are required? What jurisdictional elements are
required?
II. IS NURD LIABLE TO BRANU UNDER RCRA
7002 FOR NURD'S DISPOSAL OF THE
CHEMICAL KNOWN AS "ROOF ACID"?
(BRANU answers in the affirmative, NURD and EPA an-
swer in the negative)
A. The Background of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act Citizen Suit Provision
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA) was enacted by Congress to protect the public health
and environment. RCRA's purpose is to reduce "the genera-
tion of hazardous wastes.. .as expeditiously as possible" and
to properly treat, store, or dispose of "waste that is neverthe-
less generated." 42 U.S.C. §6902. Since 1976 RCRA has been
amended several times to increase its protection over re-
sources, changing from a prospective statute to one providing
a retrospective remedy.
Congress significantly expanded the citizen suit provi-
sion of RCRA by adding section 7002(a)(1)(B) in the Hazard-
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ous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. This subsection
provides, in pertinent part, that:
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own be-
half... against any person.. . including any past or pres-
ent generator,.... or past or present owner or operator of a
disposal facility, who has contributed to or who is contrib-
uting to the past or present ... disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)
The jurisdiction of the court over citizen's suits was similarly
expanded:
"The district court shall have jurisdiction without regard to
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties,
... to restrain any person who has contributed or who is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or haz-
ardous waste referred to in paragraph (1) (B), to order such
person to take such other action as may be necessary, or
both." Id.
Prior to 1984 the powers of the district courts were lim-
ited in scope. The only jurisdictional powers that the court
had under the provision was to "enforce any order or regula-
tion or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty
as the case may be." 42 U.S.C. §6972 (1978), amended by 42
U.S.C. §6972 (1984). The 1984 amendment was devised to
complement, rather than conflict with the Administrator's ef-
forts to eliminate threats to public health and the environ-
ment, particularly where the Government is unable to take
action because of inadequate resources. H.Rep. No. 198, 98th
Cong. 2d Sess., pt 1 at 53 (1983), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
5576, 5612.
The amendments expanded the range of remedies open
to citizens by adding a new private right of action against any
person whose handling of a solid or hazardous waste contrib-
utes or contributed to an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to human health or the environment. H.Rep. No.
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198, Cong. 2d Sess. pt 1, at 53 (1984), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612. Citizen suits are currently avail-
able to private parties seeking to protect the environment
and public health from hazardous waste pollutants.
The clarity, as well as any ambiguities associated with
§ 7002 should be the main point of an argument as to the in-
tent of Congress. First, the language of the statute itself
must be assessed to determine its meaning. If the language
is unambiguous, then the plain meaning of the statute con-
trols. The Court must assume that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of words used in a statute
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985).
B. DOES §7002 OF RCRA PROVIDE A PRIVATE CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR RESTITUTION
The issue raised on appeal is whether § 7002, as
amended in 1984 allows BRANU to recover its cleanup costs
from NURD. Section 7002 does not specifically mention
cleanup costs. Under Supreme Court precedent, additional
remedies cannot be read into a federal statute which explic-
itly sets forth a remedy, absent clear Congressional intent.
Section 7002 does not specifically limit relief to injunctions.
General grants of jurisdiction allow courts their full range of
equitable powers to remedy a situation or enforce a statute.
See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). Only
if Congress explicitly restricts the jurisdiction of the court or
creates an "inescapable inference, restrict[ing] the court's ju-
risdiction in equity" can the court's traditional powers be re-
stricted. Absent such language or direction, the "full scope of
the jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied." Porter, 328
U.S. at 398.
At question is whether the monetary award BRANU
seeks is for damages or can it be characterized as restitution-
ary. As a general rule money damages have been considered
a legal and not an equitable remedy. Unless a statute clearly
states otherwise, when money damages are for a sum certain
they will be deemed equitable only if they are sought to pro-
tect against potential future harm or to remedy unjust en-
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richment. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3rd Cir.
1979); cert. denied 441 U.S. 961 (1979). Cleanup costs fre-
quently exceed the value of the property. BRANU will argue
that unless it is allowed restitution of the cleanup costs,
NURD will be unjustly enriched.
The United States Supreme Court holds as a canon of
statutory construction that the words employed by Congress
were those intended and chosen for their common definition
and interpretation. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456
U.S. 63, 68 (1982). All of the parties may argue for the ac-
ceptance of the "plain meaning" of the statute. NURD and
EPA will argue that the plain language and legislative his-
tory of § 7002 permit only limited injunctive relief for private
parties, that there is no implied private cause of action under
§ 7002. BRANU will argue that the plain language and legis-
lative history of § 7002 grant the Court broad equitable juris-
diction, which includes restitution.
Key portions of § 7002 which must be discussed are the
phrases "civil action"; "imminent and substantial endanger-
ment"; "jurisdiction without regard to the amount in contro-
versy"; and "to order such person to take such other action as
may be necessary".
In § 7002 Congress provided that any person may com-
mence a "civil action on his own behalf." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6972(a). Black's Law Dictionary defines "civil action" as an
"action brought to enforce, redress or protect private rights
... includ[ing] all actions, both those formerly known as equi-
table and those known as legal action." Black's Law Diction-
ary 245 (6th ed. 1990).
Section 7002 states "[a]ny action under paragraph (a)(1)
of this subsection shall be brought in the district court.. .. "
42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a). "Action" as used in a legal context is
defined as "an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by
which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, redress or prevention of a wrong ....
Black's Law Dictionary 28.
Section 7002 authorizes the district courts to review ac-
tions "without regard for the amount in controversy." 42
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U.S.C.A. § 6972(a)(2). Typically, an amount in controversy is
used to prevent suits seeking small amounts from clogging
the federal court system. In the typical action for an injunc-
tion the court need not determine damages or establish an
amount in controversy.
In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court found that four
equally-weighted factors must be reviewed when determining
whether a private cause of action was implied by Congress:
(1) is the plaintiff a member of a class for which the statute
was enacted to provide an "especial benefit?"; (2) is there im-
plicit or explicit legislative intent to create the remedy?; (3) is
the action within the purposes of the legislative scheme?; and
(4) is the cause of action usually relegated to state law? Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
The Supreme Court has since modified the holding in
Cort v. Ash. These factors are no longer balanced equally, the
central inquiry in applying the test is finding an intent to cre-
ate a private cause of action in the legislative history. Touche
Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979). Once intent is
established, the Court may consider the three remaining Cort
factors. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). The Courts
have found that "the legislature alone has the responsibility
for determining the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts"
and that Congress alone should determine when private par-
ties are to be given causes of action under the legislation
which it adopts. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 742-749 (1979). The "key to the inquiry" is whether
there is a "strong indicia of Congressional intent to provide
the remedy in question." Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 12, 15.
1. Court Decisions On Implied Private Causes of
Action Under Other Statutes
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)
the Court failed to find a private cause of action for damages
under §17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, stating
that "we are extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action in
§17(a) that is significantly broader than the remedy Congress
chose to provide." Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 574. In Trans-
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america Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the
Court held that § 206 of the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940
did not create a private cause of action for damages, citing
Touche Ross and invoking the "elemental canon" of statutory
construction that where a statute expressly provides a partic-
ular remedy or remedies, courts will be extremely reluctant
to read other remedies into it. Transamerica Mortgage Advi-
sors, 444 U.S. at 19. In Karahalios v. National Federation of
Federal Employees, 489 U.S. 527 (1989), the Court held that
no private cause of action existed under Title VII of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, finding no Congressional intent
to create such a right in the Act's language, structure or leg-
islative history. Karahalios, 489 U.S. 527, 537. The Supreme
Court has also failed to find a private cause of action in fed-
eral environmental statutes as well.
In California v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court held
that no private cause of action existed under §10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act. Sierra Club, 451 U.S at 287. The Court
applied the Cort factors as the criteria for deciding whether
Congress intended to create a private cause of action. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. at 293. The Court criticized the lower court,
for failing to examine either the language or the legislative
history of the Act, stating that "the federal judiciary will not
engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that
Congress did not intend to provide." Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at
293. The Court then examined the language of the statute
and its legislative history. It found that the Act was not in-
tended to create federal rights for the especial benefit of a
class of persons, but rather that it was intended to benefit the
public at large through a general regulatory scheme. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. at 297-8. The Court found no evidence that
Congress intended a private cause of action. Id. The Court
found it unnecessary to determine whether the purpose of the
Act would be advanced by an implied private action or
whether such a remedy was within the federal domain of in-
terest. Id at 298. These factors, the Court stated, were only
of relevance if the first two factors give indication of congres-
sional intent to create the remedy. Id.
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In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1980), the Supreme Court
held that no private causes of action for damages existed
under the citizen suit provisions of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act (FWPCA). Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 15.
The Court held that both Acts contained detailed provisions
explicitly authorizing enforcement suits by government offi-
cials and private citizens, which therefore precluded finding
that Congress intended to authorize additional judicial reme-
dies for private citizens suing under the Acts. Id at 14. The
Court further cited Transamerica and reiterated that when
"a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or reme-
dies, a court must be chary of reading others into it."
The FWPCA citizen suit provision authorized private
parties to file suit in federal district court to force the EPA
administrator to perform any non-discretionary duty or to en-
force an effluent standard or limitation. 33 U.S.C. § 365.
This provision served as a model for the original RCRA citi-
zen suit provision. Sullivan, Implied Private Causes of Action
and the Recoverability Under the RCRA Citizen Suit Provi-
sion, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 10408 (Aug. 1995) at 10410, n. 36. The
lack of an implied action for restitution in the FWPCA may
be an indication that such an action was not intended in the
original RCRA § 7002. However, since the 1984 Amendments
to RCRA expanded §7002, this alone is not dispositive that an
implied private cause of action cannot now be maintained.
2. Court Decisions On Implied Private Causes of
Action Under § 7002
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d
331 (4th Cir.1983), state agencies and private plaintiffs
brought an action against an operator of industrial waste dis-
posal business to enjoin alleged violations of state and federal
law. The court held that a private cause of action for injunc-
tive relief was available under the RCRA citizen suit provi-
sion. However, the Court stated in dicta, that no private
cause of action for damages was available under the provi-
sion. In distinguishing the case from Sea Clammers, the
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court stated that the "private plaintiffs here did not seek an
award of damages, but rather acted as private attorneys gen-
eral in seeking the assessment of civil penalties and an in-
junction against Lamphier... [p]rovided that plaintiffs are
genuinely acting as private attorneys general rather than
pursuing a private remedy, nothing in RCRA, as in the
FWPCA, bars injunctive relief." Lamphier, 714 F.2d at 337.
Walls v. Waste Resource Corp, 761 F.2d, 311, (1985) was
the first case to consider whether there is a private cause of
action for damages under § 7002. The Court held that the
citizen suit provision of RCRA did not provide express or im-
plied private causes of action for damages. Id. at 316. The
court relied on Sea Clammers and the dicta in Lamphier, and
stated that standing under § 7002 is "limited by the subse-
quent provisions which restrict the type of relief available to
injunctive and other equitable remedies." Walls, 761 F.2d at
315.
Parties relying on the above two cases will need to note
that both were decided on the pre-1984 citizen suit provision.
BRANU will argue that it is seeking restitution, a form of
equitable relief, not damages.
In Commerce Holding Co., Inc. v. Buckstone, 749 F.Supp.
441 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), a landowner brought an action against
tenants to recover clean-up costs, under § 7002. The Court
held that while injunctive relief is available under
§ 6072(a)(1)(B), the statute does not provide a private action
for damages, nor should one be implied. Commerce Holding
at 445. The Court relied on Lamphier, stating that if it
awarded the relief sought, Commerce would be the direct ben-
eficiary of substantive relief, and that such relief would not
comport with the statute's purpose of allowing private parties
to bring suit only if they were genuinely acting as private at-
torneys general rather than pursuing a private remedy.
In Kaufman and Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 822
F.Supp. 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1993), the Court held that the citizen
suit provision of RCRA which permitted the court to enjoin
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or envi-
ronment did not create a private cause of action restitution-
ary relief. The Court relied on Lamphier, Commerce, and
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Walls . It distinguished those cases which allowed for resti-
tution in suits brought by the EPA under § 7003. See, United
States v. Aceto, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d. 205 (3rd. Cir.
1982).
In Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. B.M.I,
847 F.Supp. 380 (E.D. VA. 1994), the Court held that the
RCRA citizen suit provision does not authorize an award of
damages for remedial/response costs or the cost of an investi-
gation of hazardous waste. Portsmouth, 847 F. Supp at 384.
The court based its decision on Congressional intent, demon-
strated by the plain language and legislative history of the
§ 7002, as well as on the existence of an alternate remedy. Id
at 385. The court held that remedial and response costs were
beyond the powers of the district court to grant under the citi-
zen suit provision, as it allows only claims by parties acting
as private attorneys general, not those pursuing private rem-
edies. Id (citing Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331).
The Portsmouth court also addressed the issue of the im-
pact the amended citizen suit provision on its interpretation
of RCRA. The Court stated that the amended provision did
not allow the claimant to be the direct beneficiary of the re-
lief. Id. Finally, the Court stated that even if the citizens suit
provision of RCRA were intended to reach past activity, the
court would be empowered only to award injunctive relief and
to require the offender to take such other action as may be
necessary, not to award damages. Id.
In Agricultural Excess and Surplus Insurance Company
v. A.B.D. Tank & Pump Co., 878 F.Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ill.
1995), the Court held that the purchaser of an underground
petroleum storage tank could not bring an action under the
RCRA citizen suit provision to recoup past remediation ex-
penses. The court found that while injunctive relief was
available under § 6972(a)(1)(B), the statute did not provide a
private action for damages.
Parties relying on the Commerce Holding, Kaufman,
Portsmouth, and Agricultural Excess need to note that all
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these cases relied on Walls, which was decided on the pre-
1984 citizen suit provision.
In the past year, two cases with fact patterns very simi-
lar to the case at bar have been decided. In KFC Western,
Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S.Ct. 41 (1995), the Court examined the statutory language
and concluded that § 7002 gave citizens an action in restitu-
tion, stating that restitution falls within the statutory au-
thorization of the district courts to require parties to take
"such other action as may be necessary." KFC at 521. In Fur-
rer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995), the Court held
that § 7002, did not explicitly provide for restitution. The
court then applied the Cort factors to determine whether
there is an implied private cause of action under § 7002. Af-
ter examining the legislative history, the court held that no
private cause of action for restitution could be implied.
C. The Intent Of Congress To Grant A Private Cause Of
Action For Restitution Under RCRA § 7002
Unless "congressional intent can be inferred from the
language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some
other source, the essential predicate for implication of a pri-
vate remedy simply does not exist." Thompson v. Thompson,
484 U.S. 175, 179, (quoting Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at
94). Congress has expressly included monetary remedies in
some environmental statutes, but not in RCRA. The Compre-
hensive Environmental Response and Recovery Act (CER-
CLA), allows an action for monetary compensation to recover
cleanup costs, 42 U.S.C §9613(f)(1) (1988). The inclusion of a
monetary remedy in CERCLA, may show that Congress did
not intend for an identical remedy to be read into RCRA. In
United States v. Rohm and Haas Delaware Valley, Inc., 2
F.3d 1265, 1272 (3rd Cir. 1993) the EPA adopted this position
and sought recover of its cleanup costs under CERCLA in-
stead of RCRA.
RCRA § 7003, 42 U.S.C. 6973(a), authorizes EPA to seek
court orders requiring the abatement of imminent and sub-
stantial endangerments related to the handling, storage and
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disposal of solid and hazardous waste. Specifically, § 7003
authorizes suit when "the past present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or
hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment." Aceto Agricul-
tural Chemicals Corp.v. United States, 872 F.2d 1373, 1377
(8th Cir. 1989). The suit may be brought against "any person
... who has contributed or who is contributing to such han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal to re-
strain such person [or] to order such person to take such
other action as may be necessary or both." Id. Section 7003
also authorizes suit upon receipt of evidence of an imminent
and substantial endangerment:
"[ulpon receipt of evidence that the past or present han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any
solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment, the Administrator may bring suit ... against any
person . . . who has contributed or who is contributing to
such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or dispo-
sal to restrain such person from [such activity], to order
such person to take such other action as may be necessary,
or both." 42 U.S.C. 6973(a); RCRA sec. 7003(a).
In United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3rd Cir. 1982),
the Court held that § 7003 of RCRA gave the district court
equitable powers to grant the Administrator a preliminary
injunction to obtain finding for diagnostic study of a waste
site from the defendants. The Court stated that prompt pre-
ventive action was the most important consideration, and re-
imbursement could thereafter be directed against those
parties ultimately found liable. However, the court limited
its equitable jurisdiction "to the extent necessary to eliminate
any risks posed by toxic wastes." Id. at 214.
Relying on Price, the Eighth Circuit gave the EPA a right
of restitution in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal & Chemical Co. Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) and
Aceto. In Northeastern Pharmaceutical, the Court held that
the Administrator may collect an equitable award of abate-
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ment costs from persons who non-negligently contributed to
endangerment. Northeastern Pharmaceutical 810 F. 2d at
731. The court stated that the Act imposed liability for pres-
ent and future conditions resulting from past acts. Id. In
Aceto, the Court allowed the EPA to sue to recover its re-
sponse costs incurred in the clean-up of a pesticide manufac-
turing facility. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375. In deciding these
cases, the court found that the EPA had an implied right of
restitution under § 7003 of RCRA. Subsequent to Northeast-
ern Pharmaceutical and Aceto EPA determined that it has no
right of restitution under RCRA, Rohm and Haas, 2 F.3d at
1272.
The language of § 7003 that permits governmental bod-
ies to recover restitution for cleanup costs is almost identical
to the language of § 7002. Identical words used in different
parts of the same statute are intended to have the same
meaning Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. Inc., 115 S.Ct 1061, 1067
(1995). The legislative history states that citizens were to be
given "exactly the same broad substantive and procedural
claim for relief which is already available to the United
States under § 7003" such that "[any difference in language
between these amendments and § 7003 are not intended to
reflect a difference in such claims, but to merely clarify that
citizens will have the same claim presently available to the
United States." S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 55, 57
(1983),(citing 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6972-73), reprinted in Legisla-
tive History, at 2082.
However, the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce explained in its report concerning the 1984 RCRA
Amendments to § 7002 that the new provision would give cit-
izens a limited right to sue in endangerment cases "only if the
Administrator after receiving notice, fails to file an action."
H.R. Rep. No. 198, Part I, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5611-12. The Senate Report also
states that the citizen suit provision was "carefully restricted
to actions where violations of standards and regulations or a
failure on the part of officials to perform mandated actions is
alleged." Senate Committee on Public Works, Solid Waste
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Utilization Act of 1976, S. Rep. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
17-18 (1976).
The only limitation placed on the citizen suit in the
House Report proposal prohibited suits challenging the siting
of a hazardous waste facility. Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act
of 1983, H.R. Rep. 98-198(I), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576. The Senate proposal
placed four limitations on citizen suits, however, all four seek
to prevent public interference with the federal plan for haz-
ardous waste controls and disposal. The amendments and
conference report adopted the Senate amendment which re-
stricts citizen suits: (1) for siting of hazardous waste facili-
ties; (2) when the Administrator has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting actions under § 7003; (3) while the
state or administrative agency is actively in the removal pro-
cess pursuant to § 104 of CERCLA; and (4) where the Admin-
istrator has obtained a court order. Committee on
Environment and Public Works, Solid Waste Disposal Act
Amendments of 1983 to Accompany S. 757, S. Rep. 98-284,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-57 (1983). These amendments limit
citizen interference with federal actions or federally-designed
removal and disposal plans pursuant to RCRA. H.R. Rep. 98-
1133 at 118. The Senate sought to "authorize the federal
courts, in actions initiated by citizens under § 7002 . . . to
seek relief, including abatement." S. Rep. 98-284 at 55. This
language may indicate that citizens are authorized to seek
relief in federal courts including, but not limited to,
abatement.
D. The "Imminent And Substantial Endangerment" To
Health Or The Environment Requirement To
Maintain An Action Under RCRA § 7002.
NURD did not know at the time of its dumping that roof
acid was a listed hazardous waste. However, they have since
acknowledged that the substance they disposed of was a mix-
ture of a listed waste and fruit juice. Under RCRA, there is
no "good faith" exception that would indemnify a party from
liability due to ignorance. The committee notes for the Solid
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Waste Disposal Act Amendments, discussing the imminent
hazard standard in § 7003, states that RCRA has always
reached "generators, regardless of fault or negligence." H.R.
Rep. 98-198(I) at 58. At issue is whether NURD's disposal
fulfilled the "may present an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment" standard in RCRA.
The Supreme Court has allowed the government to re-
cover an award of restitution in taking actions to protect the
public from imminent and substantial endangerment. See
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204-
205 (1967) (allowing the government a right to recover resti-
tution for abatement actions under the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899). Wyandotte promulgated a federal
rule reflecting the common law principle that government en-
tities may recover the costs of abating public nuisances.
Under this federal rule, the Administrator can recover resti-
tution under §7003 for costs incurred in abating an "immi-
nent and substantial endangerment" where a private party
cannot under §7002.
The United States Supreme Court established in
Gwaltney that RCRA is both a prospective and retrospective
statute, providing a remedy for past and ongoing endanger-
ment. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). "May" is an expansive
term which does not require an actual finding of "imminent
and substantial endangerment." Black's Law Dictionary de-
fines "inuninent" as "impending.. . threatening [and] some-
thing close at hand .... " Black's Law Dictionary 750. The
threat of harm required under RCRA is one likely to occur
based on factual considerations. The parties to this action
have agreed that site presented imminent and substantial
harm until it was remediated.
Courts have found that the EPA administrator may seek
and receive reimbursement for the cost of investigating and
remediating hazardous sites pursuant to § 7003 of RCRA.
Aceto, 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989). Specifically, the
Aceto court held that a statute authorizing suit upon receipt
of evidence of imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or environment as a result of solid or hazardous waste
does not require the EPA to file and prosecute the action
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while the endangerment exists. Id. The court stated that in
the context of a reimbursement action, this would be an "ab-
surd and unnecessary" requirement. Id (quoting district
court). The endangerment language, the court stated, is in-
tended by Congress to limit the reach of RCRA to sites where
the potential for harm is great.
The Ninth Circuit found that Congress worded § 7003
and § 7002 "almost identically" and chose to "interpret simi-
larly the relief available under the two provisions." KFC, 49
F.3d at 521-22. Neither Aceto nor KFC found that a cause of
action must be filed before remediation is completed. The
Eighth Circuit determined that the imminent and substan-
tial endangerment language in § 7003 "does not require the
EPA to file and prosecute its RCRA action while the endan-
germent exists." Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383. The Ninth Circuit
similarly held that "RCRA authorizes citizen suits with re-
spect to contamination that in the past posed imminent and
substantial danger." KFC, 49 F.3d at 521.
Public policy may favor allowing a plaintiff to clean con-
taminated property first and seek reimbursement later. KFC
W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1995).
BRANU will argue that if § 7002 only allowed recovery for
remediation of existing or future danger, many citizens would
have no incentive to immediately respond to and restore the
environmental integrity of hazardous sites. NURD will argue
that this need simply does not exist in the context of a private
cause of action for restitution, because no imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment continues to exist.
QUESTIONS FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
1. What specifically in § 7002 limits relief to injunctions? If
injunctions are the only type of relief possible, why does the
section refer to an "amount in controversy"?
2. What meaning should this court give to the phrase "order
such person to take such other action as may be necessary?
What "actions are included? What actions are excluded?
Why?
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3. A present landowner is more likely to expeditiously abate
a hazardous condition if he can recover his clean up costs.
Why would allowing recovery of cleanup costs thwart the pur-
pose of RCRA?
4. If NURD is allowed to avoid paying for its improper dispo-
sal of roof acid hasn't NURD been allowed an unjust enrich-
ment, at BRANU's expense?
5. Sections 7002 and 7003 are nearly identical. Why should
the court allow the EPA to recovery its cleanup costs, but not
allow a private citizen to recover his?
6. When must the "imminent danger to health and environ-
ment exist to allow recovery of cleanup costs?
7. The legislative history appears to both support and
counter allowing a citizen to recoup cleanup recovery costs.
What should the court do when the legislative history is
conflicting?
III. IS NURD LIABLE TO EPA AND BRANU
UNDER CERCLA 107 FOR NURD'S
DISPOSAL OF ROOF ACID
A. The Background of CERCLA and the "Mixture Rule."
The Comprehensive Environmental Response and Recov-
ery Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657 is a remedial statute which Congress
enacted to respond to such national disasters as Love Canal.
As a remedial statute, it is to be liberally construed to effectu-
ate the remedial purpose for which it was enacted. 52 FR
15937, 15937 (May 1, 1987). (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1964).
Congress broadly defined "hazardous" waste so to insure
"cradle-to-the-grave" regulation. "Hazardous waste" is de-
fined as a "solid waste" which may "pose a substantial pres-
ent or potential hazard to human health or the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of,
or otherwise managed." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). The EPA was
delegated the responsibility of promulgating criteria which
would more specifically define which chemicals are "hazard-
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ous", 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a),(b), RCRA § 3001(a),(b), and further
required the EPA to promulgate regulations "as may be nec-
essary to protect human health and the environment." 42
U.S.C. §§ 6922-6924. Accordingly, the EPA promulgated a
"mind-numbing" set of regulations designed to further the
general Congressional mandate set out in CERCLA. One of
these promulgated rules was the much litigated "mixture
rule." Congress re-authorized and amended CERCLA in
1986, without altering the final 1980 "mixture" rule.
EPA issued its final "hazardous waste" definition rules in
1980. A "solid" waste is "hazardous" if, it is not expressly ex-
cluded, and if, it is either "listed" as a hazardous waste,(40
C.F.R §261.3 (A)(2)(II) (1994) or, it fails any of the "character-
istic" tests
40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (a)(2)(i) (1994). A mixture of characteristic
and solid waste is hazardous, unless the resultant mixture no
longer fails any of the "characteristic tests". 40 C.F.R. § 261.3
(a)(2)(iii) (1994). A mixture of listed hazardous waste and
solid waste is hazardous until the listed material is "de-
listed." 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (a)(2)(iv) (1994). Any solid gener-
ated by the transport, storage, or disposal of such waste. is a
"derived-from" waste, which is also subject to the hazardous
waste regulatory regime. 40 C.F.R. 261.3 (c)(2) (1994).
The time at which a solid waste becomes hazardous is
when it is listed,
40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (b)(1) (1994) when a listed waste is first ad-
ded to a solid waste,
40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (b)(2) (1994) or when the waste fails any of
the "characteristic" tests.
40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (b)(3) The time at which a solid waste is no
longer hazardous is when it does not fail the "characteristic"
tests, 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (d)(1) (1994) and, if the waste "con-
tains," or is "derived from" listed waste, such listed wastes
must also be delisted.
40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (d)(2) Until the conditions in subsection (d)
occur, wastes determined to be "hazardous" under subsec-
tions (a) and (b) do not lose their hazardous designation.
40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (c)(1) (1994).
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1. Shell Oil
The D.C. Court of Appeals invalidated the "mixture" and
the "derived-from" rules, because the EPA failed to comply
with the APA "notice-and-comment" provisions 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(B). The court held that the final 1980 EPA regu-
lations, which included the "mixture" and the "derived-from"
rules were not "logical outgrowths" of its proposed 1978 regu-
lations. See, e.g. American Fedn of Labor v. Donovan, 757
F.2d 330, 338-339 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court examined the
EPA's stated intent concerning how to regulate hazardous
waste, as revealed in its final 1980 statements in the Federal
Register, and compared these statements to its expressed in-
tentions concerning how it intended to regulate hazardous
wastes as published in the proposed 1978 regulations.
The proposed rules indicated that listed hazardous
wastes could be automatically delisted whenever Industry
could show that such wastes possessed no "characteristic" of
hazardous waste, 43 Fed. Reg. 58946 (Dec. 18, 1978). How-
ever, the complexity of a comprehensive hazardous waste re-
gime made it impossible for EPA to accurately determine
credible "characteristic" tests for certain types of chemicals,
45 Fed. Reg. 33,095 (May 19, 1980). Further, the demands of
developing a comprehensive, national hazardous waste man-
agement plan made precise tailoring to individual cases im-
possible, so that the EPA was unable to avoid under-
regulation and overregulation. Id. at 33,088. The 1980 final
legislative rules issued pursuant § 3001(a) included for the
first time a complicated, formal "delisting" process as the sole
means for a company to escape Subtitle C regulation if it used
a listed hazardous waste. The court invalidated the "mixture'
and "derived-from" rules because these legislative rules were
not "logical outgrowths" of the 1978 proposed regulations,
and, therefore, the "mixture" and "derived-from" rules had
not been promulgated in accordance with the APA "notice
and comment provisions. The court did not reach Industry's
argument that these rules unlawfully expanded EPA's Subti-
tle C jurisdiction, as it invalidated the mixture rule on proce-
dural grounds.
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The extent to which the Court vacated § 261.3 will likely
be contested. As the "mixture" and "derived from" rules do
not explicitly refer to § 261.3(c)(1) and (d)(2), EPA has main-
tained that these two sections are still valid. Upon these sec-
tions EPA has based its "contained in" policy, discussed infra.
NURD will refer to the EPA's preamble to the 1980 final rules
where it stated that EPA created the "mixture" rule to close a
"major regulatory loophole", 45 Fed. Reg. 33,095 (May 19,
1980)
2. The "Good Cause" Exemption.
The EPA followed the D.C. Court of Appeals' recommen-
dations and reissued the mixture rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 7628
(March 3, 1992), again stating that without such a rule, gen-
erators of hazardous waste could potentially evade regulation
by mixing listed hazardous waste, even though land disposal
restrictions ("LDRs"), and the EPA's prohibition of diluting as
a substitute for adequate treatment apply at the point of a
waste's generation.
40. C.F.R. § 2618.3(a). The EPA stated, "wastes may be
mixed with other wastes at the point of generation, so that
they arguably would not meet the listing description at [the
point of generation] and so would not be subject to LDRs." 57
Fed. Reg. 7628 (March 3, 1992). The EPA also stated its be-
lief that the holding in Shell Oil does not retroactively remove
the mixture rule, citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, and American Gas Association v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136,
150. The holding as such was purely procedural, and the
court's recommendation that:
In light of the dangers that may be posed by a discontinu-
ity in the regulation of hazardous wastes, however, the
agency may wish to consider reenacting the rules, in whole
or part, on an interim basis under the "good cause" exemp-
tion of 5 U.S. § 553(b)(3)(B) pending full notice and oppor-
tunity for comment. Shell Oil at 950 F.2d 741, 752, 292
U.S.App.D.C. 332, 343.
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suggests that the "dangers of discontinuity" in regulating
hazardous wastes outweigh the concerns usually given when
a court retroactively voids an administrative rule.
After the Shell Oil decision was published, but before it
was scheduled to become effective on January 21, 1992, the
EPA filed a petition for rehearing, hoping to "clarify" that the
Shell Oil ruling applied on prospectively. The court denied
the petition for rehearing, and on February 18, 1992, Admin-
istrator Reilly simultaneously removed and reissued on an
interim basis the mixture and derived-from provisions. 57
Fed. Reg. 7,638 (1992). Also included was a "sunset provi-
sion," Id., at 7,633; 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(e) (1992), which would
have kept the rules in effect only until April 28, 1993. Due to
a storm of opposition by environmental organizations and
several States, the "Chafee Amendment" was enacted by Con-
gress. Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571 (1992). This
amendment forbid the EPA from terminating the mixture
rule, and required it to revise the mixture rule by October 1,
1994. See 57 Fed. Reg. 49,278 (1992). The EPA subsequently
withdrew the "sunset provision," id., and stated that the mix-
ture and derived-from rules "remain in effect until EPA takes
final action to revise these rules." Id. The mixture rule has
remained in this "interim" posture to date.
The interim final rule was challenged in Mobil Oil Corp.
v. EPA, 35 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The D.C. Court of Ap-
peals held that the Chafee Amendment was binding upon the
courts, and therefore the court was precluded from offering
petitioners the relief they sought. Id., at 583. NURD will
bring to the Court's attention that the Chafee Amendment
required EPA to promulgate final revisions to the mixture
rule by October 1, 1994, which EPA failed to do. Therefore
the Mobil Oil decision is no longer binding law. EPA will cat-
egorize the "interim status" of the mixture rule as described
in the next section.
3. Interim Rules Issued on Remand"Policy Paralysis"
In "good cause" cases, courts are faced with the difficult
balancing of the need for public comment and legitimately
promulgated rules, against agency interests in fulfilling stat-
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utory mandates and deadlines. Some courts have exercised
their inherent equitable powers to reconcile the need to up-
hold the value of public participation, yet allow the agency to
carry out important responsibilities. For example, in Mid-
Tex Electric Cooperative v. FERC, 822 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir.
1987), FERC responded to a court's reversal of a promulgated
rule by simultaneously issuing a new notice or proposed
rulemaking which addressed the deficiencies leading to its re-
versal in court, and, issued an interim rule which was sub-
stantially the same as the vacated rule. Even though the
interim rule did not satisfy the APA notice-and-comment pro-
visions, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that an agency can
repromulgate promptly a rule that was reversed and re-
manded if (1) the major elements of the rule were affirmed,
(2) the repromulgated rule is adopted only as an interim mea-
sure in an ongoing process to establish a permanent rule, and
(3) the interim rule includes features that represent a good
faith effort to ameliorate on an interim basis the problems
created by the original rule that caused the court to reverse
the rule. Davis, § 7.13, p. 372.
United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572 (8th Cir.
1981), and Western Oil & Gas Association v. EPA, 633 F.2d
803 (9th Cir. 1980) demonstrate the use of the "good cause"
exemption in an environmental context. Both cases arose the
1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, requiring states to
list various areas as "attainment" or "nonattainment." Fol-
lowing publication of these lists, several industrial interests
filed suit, claiming the publication of the final lists did not
satisfy notice-and-comment requirements. The EPA admit-
ted that it did not follow § 553, but argued that the February
3, 1978 deadline provided sufficient "good cause" to allow it to
forego normal rulemaking procedures. Notes, Remedies For
Noncompliance with Section 553 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, Duke L.J. 461, at 468. The courts rejected the
EPA's argument, but left the lists in effect pending the EPA's
compliance on remand, as the court has discretion to shape
an equitable remedy. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649
F.2d at 577; Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d at 576,
citing Ford Motor Company v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364 (1939).
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Other circuits have similar rulings. See Republic Steel
Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, United States Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1035
(1980) (EPA "good cause" argument successful); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3rd Cir. 1979), United States
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.), modified on re-
hearing, 598 F.2d 915 (1979), New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d
1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (the courts invalidated the challenged
designations).
EPA will apply the Mid-Tex analysis, arguing that the
overwhelming majority of the regulations are still valid and
that EPA reissued the "mixture" rule in a way similar to
FERC in Mid-Tex. NURD will contest this assertion, based
upon the retroactivity argument discussed infra.
B. The Retroactive Effect of the Mixture Rule and Shell
Oil
Prior to 1988, an agency could give a legislative rule ret-
roactive effect unless a court concluded that retroactivity
served no legitimate purpose and was unfair. Davis, §6.6, p.
256, citing Citizens to Save Spencer Cty. v. EPA, 600 F.2d
844, 879-881 (D.C.Cir. 1979). "Every case of first impression
has a retroactive effect, whether the new principle is an-
nounced by a court or by an administrative agency. But such
retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of pro-
ducing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to
legal and equitable principle." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 203 (1947). In that case, the Court upheld the ret-
roactive "clarification" of uncertain law through adjudication
and to a slight extent legalizing retroactive overruling of pre-
viously established law. This balancing test was further dis-
cussed two decades later in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, (1965) The Court stated, "we believe that the Constitu-
tion neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect, . . .
once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to
apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospec-
tively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will
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further or retrad its operation." Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 629 (1965), See also, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281 , 313, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 1723, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979)
(holding that a regulation not promulgated pursuant to the
proper notice and comment procedure has no force or effect of
law, and therefore is void ad initio); Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA,
935 F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("when equity demands,
an unlawfully promulgated regulation can be left in place
while the agency provides the proper procedural remedy.").
This balancing test was drastically changed, however, af-
ter the Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S.
209 (1988) decision. The Court unanimously held that the
Department of Health and Human Services lacks power to
promulgate retroactive legislative rules to implement the
Medicare Act. In doing so, the Court created a new rule of
statutory construction which presumes that a statutory grant
of legislative rulemaking power does not, unless expressly
conveyed, encompass the power to promulgate retroactive
rules. 488 U.S. at 208. This holding was subsequently
strengthened in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct.
1483 (1994) and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., - U.S.-,
114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994). First, the presumption trumps the
canon of construction that requires a court "to apply the law
in effect at the time it renders its decision." 144 S.Ct. at
1496. Second, a congressional decision to "legislatively over-
rule" a prior judicial interpretation of a statute is insufficient
alone to establish congressional intent to render the legisla-
tive enactment retroactive 114 S. Ct. at 1515. Third, the pre-
sumption against retroactive legislation can be overcome only
by "clear evidence" of congressional intent to give the legisla-
tion retroactive effect. 114 S. Ct. at 1508. See Davis, Admin-
istrative Law § 6.7, at 48, (Supp. 1995).
This new canon has its limits, however, in United States
v. Carlton, -U.S.-, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994), a unanimous
Court held that retroactive taxation is permissible if it is a
rational means of furthering a legitimate legislative purpose,
provided "clear evidence" existed showing that "Congress it-
self has considered the potential unfairness of retroactive ap-
plication and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay
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for the countervailing benefits." 114 S. Ct. at 1501. Such
countervailing benefits may include the fact that prospective-
only changes in rules create a powerful incentive to delay the
rulemaking process. Davis, Administrative Law § 6.6, at 248,
(3rd Ed. 1994).
NURD will argue that the Georgetown University line of
cases directly applies to the case at bar. EPA will argue that
the "contained in" policy, discussed infra is similar to the ret-
roactive "clarification" upheld by the Chenery decision. Fur-
ther EPA will argue that the purpose of CERCLA as " clearly
evidenced" in the legislative history is to hold prior owners
liable for hazardous waste cleanup costs. Without retroactive
application CERCLA's main purpose would be thwarted.
2. Judicial Retroactive and Prospective Overruling of
Agency Action.
The EPA has maintained in official statements and when
litigating cases that the Shell Oil vacation of the mixture rule
was prospective only, based upon the Chevron Oil v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97 (1971) case. Three elements must be established
for a court to hold that a ruling only applies prospectively.
First, the new principle of law must either overrule clearly
relied upon past precedent, or, be a case of first impression.
Second, the Linkletter analysis is applied, and, third, the
court must insure that no inequities as described in Chenery
result.
In Goodner Brothers, the court found that James B.
Beam Distilling Co v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991), narrowed
the Chevron Oil holding, and that the plain meaning of the
word "vacate" inferred a retroactive invalidation of the mix-
ture rule. The court interpreted the James B. Beam Distil-
ling Co. ruling as stating that if a court does not expressly
reserve the question of retroactivity, it is properly understood
to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application in
civil cases. James B. Beam Distilling, 115 L.Ed.2d 490. At
issue in the case were two jury instructions stated at trial,
one defining "hazardous waste" under RCRA, and one defin-
ing "hazardous waste" under CERCLA. As the RCRA in-
struction included the mixture rule as a way to define
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hazardous waste, the court reversed and remanded the trial
court's RCRA jury instruction. However, the CERCLA in-
struction solely relied on the trial court's conclusion that un-
diluted paint removers, containing 50-70% methylene
chloride, before use, constituted a F002 listed "spent solvent",
and therefore, was a hazardous waste. On appeal, the court
found the CERCLA instruction appropriate and upheld the
CERCLA counts, because the description of F002 waste, as
published in the CFR, covered the disputed material.
C. The "Contained-In" Policy
Although the "mixture" rule and the "derived-from" rule
were invalidated by Shell Oil, (c)(1) and (d)(2) remain intact.
The EPA has used these legally in force regulations upon
which to base the "continuing jurisdiction principle." The
D.C. Circuit upheld application of this principle to contami-
nated environmental media. Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court char-
acterized the rule as a "gloss on, not a reiteration of, the 1980
rules." Id. As such, the principle is a new agency action trig-
gering its own statutory review period. Based upon the pre-
amble to the 1980 regulations, the then valid derived-from
and mixture rules, and the "hammer" provisions in the 1984
amendments for land disposal, the court held that the inter-
pretive rule was "reasonable." Accord U.S. v. Bethlehem
Steel, 829 F.Supp. 1023, vacated in part.
This opinion was echoed in U.S. v. Marine Shale Proces-
sors, 1994 WL 419910, 39 ERC 1413 (E.D. La.), reconsidera-
tion denied, 1994 WI 669576 (E.D. La. 1994).
D. The "Continuing Jurisdiction Principle"
Besides examining the legislative and administrative
record so to determine the specific definitions of specific kinds
of listed waste (i.e. F002, F006), an endeavor which is not fea-
sible to pursue in the instant case, the EPA has also ad-
vanced a continuing jurisdiction principle, ("CJP") from
which to base regulating wastes in lieu of the mixture rule.
This theory was first advanced in Chemical Waste, which was
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heard concurrently with Shell Oil. Unlike Shell Oil, the
court did not rule on the validity of any EPA regulation, but
instead examined whether the EPA's "interpretative rules"
pertaining to restrictions on land disposal were reasonable.
See 53 Fed. Reg. 3117 (August 17, 1988). Interpretive rules
simply restate or "clarify" existing statutes or regulations,
and, unlike legislative rules, are not subject to 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b), American Hospital Association v. Bowen, 834 F.2d
1037, 1045. At issue were two "interpretive principles:" the
"retroactive principle," and the "media principle." The retro-
active principle states that any leachate actively managed af-
ter underlying wastes are listed are considered hazardous as
well, regardless of the time of disposal. Id. at 1147. The me-
dia principle states that any mixture of listed and media ma-
terial (i.e., solid or groundwater) is hazardous. Id. at 1142.
The court found that the EPA clearly stated the retroactivity
principle in the summary to each notice, and, further, even if
insufficient notice was given, the principles appear to be in-
terpretations of the "derived from" rule, and were not subject
to 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). "The EPA cannot be faulted for attempt-
ing to provide clarification of a pre-existing regula-
tion."Chemical Waste, at 1535.
As to the "media" principle, the court found that the in-
terpretive rule was not clearly discernable from the 1980
rules. In General Carbon Company v. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, 860 F.2d 479, the court
noted that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations
will be accepted unless it is plainly wrong, and that courts
necessarily must show considerable deference to an agency's
expertise when faced with a highly technical question. MCI
Cellular Telephone Company v. FCC, 738 F.2d 1322, 133
(D.C.Cir. 1984). The court began its analysis with the "con-
tinuing jurisdiction principle," which means that a hazardous
waste will remain a hazardous waste until it is delisted. 40
C.F.R. §§ 261.3(c)(1), 261.3(d)(2).See also, 45 Fed Reg 33,0906
(May 19, 1980). The court found the media principle to be
consistent with the CJP, as well as the derived-from and mix-
ture rules. The court, in concluding that the "media" princi-
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ple was a reasonable interpretation of existing regulations
stated:
[the derived-from and mixture rules] demonstrate that the
agency's rule on contaminated soil is part of a coherent
regulatory framework. It is one application of a general
principle, consistently adhered to, that a hazardous waste
does not lose its hazardous character simply because it
changes form of is combined with other substances. Chemi-
cal Waste at 1539
The continuing jurisdiction principle was also addressed
in United States v. Reticel Foam, 858 F.Supp. 726 (E.D. Tenn.
1993). The EPA argued that even without the mixture rule,
hazardous waste remains hazardous until it is delisted. An
example of this principle is evidenced in the "media" rule,
where a mixture "containing" hazardous waste is treated as
hazardous material without application of the mixture rule.
The court disagreed, finding that the "contained-in" policy
had only been applied to mixtures of hazardous waste and
media materials. The court distinguished the ruling in
United States Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1, 829 F.Supp.
1023 (N.D. Ind. 1993), by observing that in that case, the
waste at issue was F006, and that the waste in that case
clearly fell within the F006 definition for sludge. In United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation 11, 38 F.3d 862 (1994)
the 7th Circuit agreed with the ruling in Reticel Foam, hold-
ing that the CJP applies not to mixtures of hazardous and
nonhazardous solid wastes, but to mixtures of hazardous
waste and environmental media. Id. at 871
The EPA has codified the "contained-in" principle, 57
Fed. Reg. 37,225-26 (1992). Hazardous debris is now regu-
lated under the "contained-in principle," and the EPA has
proposed to supplement the contained-in policy by including
environmental media. 58 Fed. Reg. 48,092, 48123 (1993).
Non-waste media (such as soil or groundwater) that contain
listed hazardous waste must be managed as hazardous
waste. 57 Fed. Reg. 21450, 21453 (May 20, 1992).
In Re: Hardin County is perhaps the most extensive
opinion to date concerning the mixture rule and the Shell Oil
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decision. Citing Goodner Brothers and Reticel Foam, the En-
vironmental Appeals Board held that the Shell Oil vacation
was retroactive. Judges Firestone and Reich held that be-
cause the state mixture rule is broader in scope than the
"contained-in" policy, it was unnecessary for the Board to rule
on the validity of the "contained-in" policy. Judge McCallum,
noting that in the EPA's preamble to the 1980 final rules it
stated that the mixture rule was "necessary to close a major
loophole," in Subtitle C, interpreted the Shell Oil decision to
mean that the EPA no longer retained jurisdiction over waste
mixtures composed of listed hazardous waste and non-haz-
ardous solid waste.
QUESTIONS FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
1. To what extent did Shell Oil invalidate the hazardous
waste definitions?
2. Is the current interim "mixture rule" legally binding on
the regulated community?
3. Did Shell Oil retroactively invalidate the "mixture rule"?
4. Is the "contained in" policy a legally binding rule? If so to
what materials does it apply?
5. Is there clear evidence that Congress wished to give the
"mixture rule" retroactive effect?
6. To what extent does the Georgetown University holding al-
ter the Chenery and Linkletter balancing test?
7. Why did the EPA claim to be closing a "major regulatory
loophole" when it enacted the 'mixture rule" in 1980? If the
mixture rule was invalid, didn't this "loophole" remain open?
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